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On 28th February 2016, Argentina finally reached a settlement
with the rest of its holdout creditors lead by Elliot Management
in what is being hailed as ‘historic’ signalling the return of
Argentina to international bond markets. While the pesky details
of the settlement agreement are yet to be hammered out (at the
time of writing), it is however known that in substance, Argentina
has agreed to shell out a total of around $4.4 billion to the
holdouts including Elliott Management, Aurelius Capital
Management, Davidson Kempner and Bracebridge Capital. In
sum, that represents a 25% write down of the original debt
amount previously owed to the funds. While indeed, the present
agreement unlocks Argentina’s financial leg room in the
international capital market, thus providing a fillip to its already
distressed economy, the agreement is also a manifestation of
almost 15 years of desolate and futile negotiations, characterized by opportunity costs, derailed investments, scarce
liquidity and immense deadweight losses leading to a general reduction in economic welfare. That apart, one
wonders whether it is ethical or moral for a few set of private funds to arm-twist a sovereign into a contractual
enforcement claim, that causes at best a deflection of governmental resources towards defending such claims and
at worst, obstruction and hindrance in performing essential governmental functions. Moreover, in the present
instance, there was every possibility that the deadlock would have continued unabated, lest for Judge Griesa’s
unflinching stance towards a resolution. By indicating his disapproval for continuing with the ‘no pay-out’ injunction
against Argentina, which had hitherto allowed a leverage to the holdouts in the negotiations, Judge Griesa tilted the
balance in favour of Argentina, finally leading to the settlement.
Flashback to 2012 and readers will remember that Greece, during its debt restructuring phase, had similarly
experienced a holdout situation characterized by a minority group of bondholders demanding for a full pay-out. It
was indeed to avoid a long drawn court ligation, that Greece readily agreed to pay the holdouts in full (around
€6billion), inviting criticism from various quarters for its compromising stance and for setting an undesirable
precedent.
Both the Greece and Argentinian debacle shows that sovereign defaults are a recurring phenomenon, and the
absence of definitive rules, leads to a messy, prolonged and an unsatisfactory outcome. Against that backdrop, this
post argues that the entire episode ought to nudge policy makers around the world to acknowledge and act upon the
problem of holdouts on a more sustained, determined and collective basis.
Tracing Argentina’s Default
On 31st July 2014, with negations between the Argentinian government and its bondholders at a draw, the country
defaulted on its sovereign debt for the second time in about a decade. At the heart of the problem was not the
‘unwillingness’ of Argentina to service its debt and honour its obligations under the debt restructuring plan as agreed
in 2005 & 2010, but the obstructionist methods of a minority group of creditors/bondholders to stall the process and
bring the country towards a default. Such bondholders are variously described as ‘holdout creditors’ and usually
comprise of certain vulture funds which buy distressed assets at very low prices, at time when the country is facing a
crisis, in anticipation of being paid out in full during the debt restructuring process. The holdouts take advantage of
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the fact that any debt restructuring plan requires the consent of all creditors and thus employ myriad forms of tactics
such as prolonged negotiations and court litigation to reclaim their amount. In 2012, a New York district-court
interpreting the pari passu clause ordered Argentina to either pay out its holdout creditors most notably NML Capital
(subsidiary of Elliot Management) to the tune of $ 1.3 billion or stop paying out majority bondholders who had
accepted the debt restructuring plan. Having rather limited options, Argentina was forced to renegotiate with NML
Capital and other holdout creditors which resulted in an ultimate stalemate on 30th July, bringing the country to
another default.
Looking to the Future – The Way ahead
Presently, bond contracts are governed either by the sovereign’s own law (as was the case of Greece) or a foreign
law, usually New York, English or German law. However, not all bond contracts provide for Collective Action clauses
(CACs) whereby a super majority of creditors can bind minority creditors as regards the restructuring terms thereby
eliminating the holdout problem. As the Argentinian saga shows, it is not always possible to include CACs either in
financing agreements or to choose a law which provides for one. Argentina had close to about 152 classes of bonds
governed by the laws of eight different jurisdictions and even with the inclusion of CAC’s, it would require the country
to reach a consensus on each of those bond issues separately. For the above set of reasons and more, CACs do
not provide an adequate and effective response to the holdout problem and have been considered by some to be ‘an
exercise in futility’.
Apart from the contractual market based approach, various scholars have advocated for a more robust,
institutionalized, rules based international sovereign restructuring mechanism. A first formal proposal was mooted by
Anne O. Krueger, the then Deputy Managing Director of IMF, in 2002 and was called the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). It was envisaged under the aegis of the IMF through a simple amendment of its
articles of agreement (AOA). In essence, it would build on the near universal membership of the IMF, to provide for a
platform to effectively negotiate a debt restructuring plan between sovereign debtors and its creditors. To address
the holdout problem, it provided for mandatory rules on supermajority voting enjoining all the members to implement
the same in their national legislations. Further, to streamline the restructuring process, once it has been activated, it
advocated for a temporary stay of litigation against the sovereign debtor. The proposal went a step further to address
the issue of stop gap funding which a sovereign may need during the restructuring process, to continue essential
governmental functions, by providing for priority status for any new funding as against old debt. Ambitious as it was,
the proposal could not see the light of the day because of a lack of political will from member countries, especially
the US.
That however has not diminished the momentum and enthusiasm of sovereign debt lawyers and academics in
contemplating and devising newer mechanisms to enforce a global bankruptcy regime. Prof. Schwarcz for instance,
has argued for a new international convention on sovereign debt restructurings incorporating most of the
mechanisms of the SDRM, however operating outside the IMF system. The proposal envisions a reduced ratification
obligation for the convention, so as to ensure its early implementation as opposed to the skewed amendment
procedures under the Articles of Association of the IMF. Further still, Prof. Heimbold suggests a model law approach
to sovereign debt restructurings, inviting member states towards adopting mirroring national legislation with
reciprocal obligations, thus ensuring certainty and predictability of the outcome of a debt restructuring exercise.
Several such proposals have been advanced with respect to the Eurozone countries in the recent past (for a
comprehensive survey see the author’s contribution here) with member states of the European Union gradually
warming up to the idea (read the recent report of  the German Council of Economic Experts arguing for a similar
mechanism).
In the light of the recurring sovereign debt problems, most acutely observed in the Argentinian deadlock and not too
long ago in the Eurozone countries, it is rather imperative that an international treaty based mechanism, much like
the SDRM is seriously considered by policy makers around the world. It would go a long way in facilitating and
enforcing an ‘orderly debt restructuring’ with minimum disruptions. In this regard, it is heartening to see that the
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United Nations General Assembly recently adopted a resolution supported by 134 countries concerning Basic
Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes on 10th September 2015 (see the author’s comments here).
The resolution has captured some of the most fundamental issues plaguing debt restructurings and despite its
unassuming tone, offers a substantial basis for future negotiations. A sovereign default is an event of immense
proportions for the economy of a country as a whole, having consequences in the nature of fleeting investors,
financial and banking crisis, continued recession and a spill over effect on the real economy. The time is ripe to
gather as much political will to convince and collaborate at an international level on sovereign debt restructurings.
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